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Within the global economy praxis and coherence of debt and value occur and 
are appropriated and propagated within the logic of an institutional framework.1 
As Annie McClanahan points out in her excellent book, Dead Pledges: Debt, 
Crisis and the Twenty-First Century Culture, “[d]ebt has certainly become the 
defining feature of economic life today.”2 The World Bank, UNESCO, the IMF and 
so on provide ways in which we can - and are meant to - think about not only 
the circulation of money and resources, but also how this circulation plays out in 
terms of pivoting international, regional and local values and priorities. However, 
the relation between debt and value only gains character from exchange within 
the domain of social relations and it is here that we must, initially at least, return 
to Marx and his Capital. It important to remember that his theory and critique of 
the political economy remain unfinished, and is therefore in many ways a work 
in progress for those who continue to engage his work. Marx considered society 
and its priorities as having an underpinning economic form: put simply, Marx 
allowed commodities to ‘speak’ their character as specific social and cultural 
forms. However, Marx also understood the invisible or hidden forms of economic 
properties as social material properties, that is, properties with value, however 
specific and nuanced these may be.  Debts therefore have values and similarly 
values are linked to debts in the circulation of capital. This means the economic 
structures of society define the social forms of thought and thus the praxis and 
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logic of how social, economic, intellectual, creative and cultural domains are 
organized and comprehended. 
 It is important to note that Marx’s theory of value is premised on labour 
as measured by the magnitude of time. So for Marx the value of labour is 
dependent on how long it takes to produce a commodity for the purposes 
of exchange. To be clear, Marx understands exchange value as the mode of 
expression or form of appearance of value manifested via money-form. Thus 
Marx’s process of abstraction of human labour is expressed as value. Marx also 
correctly considered those areas of life which allow a worker to undertake 
labour in the first instance: education, skill, access to technologies and resources, 
adequate food and housing and so on. This capacity to undertake labour is a 
necessary systematic organization implicit to production where the worker is 
interpellated into a condition of alienation. Thus, labour power as a commodity is 
the insight that allows an opening up of the human experience.
 A relation between debt and value is not just for understanding the 
political economy. It is a relation that we all must navigate, resist and try and 
make sense of and yet, outside of the political economy, this relation tends to 
be imaginary or unexplainable. However, debt and value are socially formative 
modalities which can be understood as an abstraction of the circulation of 
finance. A structural return to the political economy as a way of understanding, 
for example, creative pursuits, unpaid labour, surplus or shortage of labour, 
theological praxis, desire and so on is crucial and one could argue, unavoidable. 
Debt and value and its relation rest within both a historical teleology and a 
contemporary (unknown, even) political trajectory. The concept of value is thus 
extended beyond productivistism and towards socially valorized attitudes and 
thinking. 
 Let us consider value in its most understandable and illusive form: as a 
manifestation of the reality of the abstraction of labour, a way to think work, 
or more precisely a form to make work thinkable through wage labour and 
exchange. That is, labour is rewarded in the form of a wage and this wage 
constitutes the foundation for the mode of production as appearing as an 
actuality which cannot be disputed. However, as Michael Heinrich correctly 
argues, this relation as constituted by wage labour is mystified because everyone 
is subordinated to the determinants of the wage-form as value producing.3 He 
goes on to say that “the capitalist process of production also has a specific dual 
character: it is the unity of the labor process (which produces a specific use 
value) and the valorization process” [emphasis original].4 Heinrich is adamant 
that Marx insists such determinants, even in the exchanges of daily life, are 
socially formed between people and processes. David Graeber also deliberates 
this point when considering the neoliberal ‘fantasy’ of deregulation as not 
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dispensing with structural modes of production and accountability:
[The] government regulates everything from a bank’s reserve requirements 
to its hours of operation; how much it can charge in interest, fees, and 
penalties; what sort of security precautions it can or must employ; how 
records must be kept and reported; how and when it must inform its 
clients of their rights and responsibilities; and pretty much everything 
else.5 
 
This kind of regulatory structure is not unknown to most of us, but most of us 
do not consider this when we seek, for example, to use the bank. Our use tends 
to exist at the level of exchange of service. Therefore what frames the service is, 
for us most of the time, not thought of. Therefore when we talk of the ‘values’ 
of a particular bank we do not do so within the framework of governmental 
regulation, nor of the central relation of those values to the circulation of debt. 
Rather, such a regulatory structure, mostly unconsidered by us, provides an 
implicitly coherent understanding regarding the circulation of money, the 
merging of the public and private spheres and the individual application of 
these. For, whether in its hard physical form (coinage and notes), its symbolic 
physical access (bankcards, credit and debit cards), in its increasingly digital 
access, or even more so in what it can (or can’t) do, money is visible, tangible 
and has a presumed and understood, if fluid, value. Even money emerges from 
social relations via what Marx calls in Volume 1 of his Capital an “imaginary” 
and “irrational expression”. Heinrich clarifies that while “[l]abor creates value, 
[it] does not itself have value” [emphasis original] which appears as signified 
via wage labour.6 There is a social relation which lies behind the relation 
between humans and things so that things (commodities) can be exchanged 
systematically. However, such exchange cannot take place without certain 
social conditions being constituted: where abstraction through the conduit 
of modernity materializes as a post-industrialization logic to be relied upon. 
This appearance of labour provides an important value category for which 
to organize a relation (as well as a modality which can be repeated through 
exchange) between the condition of value and how this condition can be 
mediated socially.
 Let us provide a tangential but interesting case in point here though 
focusing on that which is difficult to measure, yet the impetus to do is often 
pursued: belief. When Stalin came to power, his first task was to destroy the 
Russian Orthodox Church – he rendered the faith itself was made obsolete, the 
clergy killed and those who were understood to practice the Russian Orthodox 
religion were tried and punished. Prior to Stalin, under socialism, the practice 
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of belief (and thus, arguably, of belonging) was considered to be separate 
from the state, or more precisely a way of implementing the project of the self 
outside of the political economy. However, Lenin implemented the decree, On 
the Separation of the Church from the State and the School from the Church 7 
as way of determining and regulating how belief, its value and form should be 
publicly declared. This kind of transmission of value offered a logical coherence, 
for better or worse, about how the practice of belief, for example, is articulated 
as being precisely a part of the logic of the political economy for it did not by-
pass morality, but rather instituted another modality: that is, a relationship to 
morality being an unstable relation (even in opposition) to truth. 
 The commodity8 of belief ‘spoke’ for itself as an ‘object’ of value and as a 
mutually recognized cultural commodity. The Russian Orthodox Church provided 
a central service to the structure of class and the circulation of money which 
was a part of this relation – and it is important to acknowledge the existence and 
practice of class under both socialism and communism. The suppression and 
elimination of religion as a cultural practice was more than just a promotion of 
the value of state sanctioned atheism and the specific devaluing of Christianity. 
It provided a way to track an extrinsic coherence of the relation, rather than 
separation, between the church and the state. That the state articulates explicitly 
how the church should function is a relation and a tension which socializes its 
values as non-praxis. That is, the exclusion but continuation of the church creates 
a secular society but not necessarily an anti-religious one. There is still the 
recognition of the private value of religion - but only for particular individuals. 
The church therefore exists in a position of debt to the state that allows, but 
frames,  both the claim and recognition - at a personal level - of its value.  This 
kind of negative value is important to realize despite its protracted and complex 
conflicts because it still privileges certain values and those structures which 
uphold it. More than this, it socially constructs belief as a form of debt: such 
a debt is a confrontation with an unmitigated subjective void which is not 
tolerated by the state. 
 So, what is tolerated by the state, what gives debt and value coherence? 
In our current context of political economy, the notion of fiscal viability and 
success characterizes more neoliberal and desirable qualities which propagate 
self responsibility and accountability as being effective. Such a critique of the 
political economy is, as Heinrich points out, a question of how history and theory 
are related to reveal comprehensive questions of such a relation as logical and 
even coherent. Marx provides, according to Heinrich and others, an anatomy of 
the classical political economy, and thus of value.9  Although debt and value are 
intrinsically linked to money, money in and of itself has no value. It only has value 
by virtue of the social relations which enable it to be transmitted for goods and 
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services- and claims of status and value. This appears and is to a large extent 
logical and coherent: money justifies its own existence through its continued 
circulation. Further, when Marx speaks of the political economy, he precisely 
understands this as an intervention of a critique of it where the value of labour is 
determined from outside of it. Such a critique starts with a deliberation of value 
as Heinrich attests:
 
This critique of categories begins with the most abstract category of 
political economy, that of value. Marx concedes that political economy 
has grapsed the ‘content’ concealed in value and its magnitude, the 
connection between labor and value.10
To recapitulate, value as connected to labour is a coherent and logical 
manifestation which gives rise to a particular trajectory experienced by most 
of us. Put simply, labour is, to use Althusser’s term, a ‘lived experience’ and an 
ideological social practice from which to derive value. One undertakes labour 
which is socially valorised and thus remunerated for their labour. This is logical 
and linear and it fits with the project of capitalism. But as we all know, this is 
not always the case. What tends to happen is that for one to demonstrate such 
a commitment to value (of labour), one must enter into debt. Debt is what is 
owed in a calculation of value. This is problematic given that value is not always 
easily measurable – nor it is desirable for it to be always measured. Thus it can 
be logically determined that debt is not always determinable. Nevertheless, a 
return to the political economy is necessary to ascertain this lack of coherence. 
Debt and value are not only concepts, they are a connected praxis which rely 
on the logic of the political economy (to function, somehow), more pertinently, 
for capitalism to function as a method one can have faith in, despite its obvious 
and hidden failings. This is assumed so because we all must, to varying degrees, 
participate in the market forces – especially pertaining to what is owed and 
what is valued. What is important here is that we exist in a system which, both 
implicitly and explicitly, demands a public declaration of what one values 
according to what one owes. In his The Making of the Indebted Man11  Maurizio 
Lazzarato considers debt as an increasingly important structure to social life, 
an instrument of control and morality. For the individual in debt, life revolves 
around this debt from which an internalisation of morality is pivoted. Debt 
here takes on a distinstively private and subjective character from which risk 
aversion is personally (as opposed to structurally) managed. In this way debt 
is elevated to an honorable mediator of equality as it cuts across social and 
cultural demographics – everyone experiences debt and thus debt is a part 
of the ongoing project of the self. What also Lazzarato implies is that debt 
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(problematically) provides a method to consider the surviellance of one’s 
effectiveness of labour. 
 Not all of measurements of value are tangible as has already been stated: 
belief is one such example of the forces of debt and value as proponents of (a 
different kind of) capital in action. The false promise that one can be free from 
capitalism is the ideological break belief purports. However, as Fabio Vighi states 
when he draws upon Lacan in his writings of the political economy, this promise 
is a fantasy:
And yet, Lacan claims that our ultimate horizon is not the epistemological 
one. For despite its necessity, epistemological alienation – whereby the 
Other “pulls the strings” and secretly informs our subject-positions – 
can be overcome, although only by “digging deeper” into the empty 
foundations of discourse qua social substance. It is at this level, where 
alienation (the delusional strategy that “anchors” every subjectivity to 
their historical Other) turns into separation (the intrinsically traumatic 
awareness that “there is no such thing as a big Other”) that we encounter 
freedom as the abyssal and unbearable inconsistency or disjointedness of 
our sociohistorical discursive constellation. For Lacan, freedom can only be 
posited in correlation with negative substantiality: “subjective destitution”, 
“traversing of the fantasy”, i.e. radical separation from the necessity of 
alienation.12
This conjures up another interesting way to understand debt and its relation 
to value as a different kind of ‘investment’, one that surrenders to alienation. 
Investment is best understood as a way of totalising social consumption. It 
justifies consumption and thus the existence of contingent crisis, if they were 
to occur as a result of market forces. Investment is praxis, an axiology, which 
is a decisive variable from which to justify potential lack. Let us return to the 
proposition of investment in belief. Belief as a social and subjective praxis 
lends itself well to a coherent understanding of belief - this is well established 
throughout history and the notion of sacrifice provides an apt example of this. 
To deviate slightly, Jean-Luc Marion’s theorisation on sacrifice (as principle 
of ‘givenness’) is important to note: that sacrifice is a gift earned through the 
establishment and order of belief.13  We can here segue to note that what is 
‘given’ in the sacrifice allows us to understands the political economy, that 
is debt and value, of that belief. However, Slavoj Žižek in his writings on the 
neighbour troubles Marion’s work closely, offering that nothing is being 
sacrificed because one always wins in some way, even in the fantastic and 
perverse call to the investment of belief.14 Belief here provides an interesting 
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coherence to justify the investment of sacrifice as it operates as another kind 
of capital, that which relies on fantasy to seduce the subject to become fully 
(or even partially) invested. One is always in debt to belief because is tends to 
provide a nuanced axiology which one must, for the most part, adhere to. These 
are sometimes very tangible practices but often not so obvious because they 
are considered so inherent to the workings of the social and political system, 
they are taken for granted. So given this lack of social visibility, one must rely 
on those who organise belief in particular ways so that it remains within the 
social (and arguably, political) realm to be repeated. Belief always ensures that 
we are always in debt and here we can note that one seeks to free oneself from 
a belief when the debt no longer corresponds to value. This is not necessarily 
a postmodern conduit, rather as Žižek states, we believe now more than ever 
before, particularly during times of crisis and uncertainty. 
 This imperative to believe, it can be argued, obfuscates the appearance 
and the handling of social and political chaos by elevating particular values by 
offering the promise of an ideological break with the chaos of the contingency 
of capitalism because belief is another value once can count on without 
(sometimes) spending a cent. Labour is rewarded in other ways: the free gift 
of one’s labour is not salvation from one’s guilt, but rather, the permissibility to 
enjoy one’s guilt. This enjoyment is not only the currency of belief, but also our 
terrifying joussiance. Debt allows us to both enjoy and maintain a semblance of 
managing the inherent violence of the credit economy. 
 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri attend to the problem of measurability 
as both an extension and critique of Marx’s conceptualisations of immaterial 
labour from the perspective of his value-form theory.15 Our desperate attempts 
to continually measure through surveillance mechanisms create a fantasy 
that labour can in fact be measured according to a logical value. This attempt 
to quantify labour along with a subjective theory of value sets up particular 
distinctions (and distortions) about what constitutes labour and what its 
corresponding value. This desire for measurability as primarily a ‘productivist’ 
one has implications for how we can consider the political uses and usefulness 
of labour as well as how such labour is conceived and acted upon.16 As Hardt 
and Negri go on to critique, the strong emphasis to the project of rationalism 
is problematic.17 This kind of theoretical pragmatism is an attempt at the 
resolving the age-old binary concerning the thinker and the worker. It also 
posits the problematic assumption that the relation between debt and value are 
conditional on an economics of behavior as being representational. 
 However, to return to our earlier question inspired by Vighi, what might 
surrendering to alienation entail, and further, how might this offer a different 
coherence of understanding debt and value as an enigma of capital? What we 
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can posit here is that belief takes a different value form from that of a tangible 
commodity, although it carries with it the same content as a commodity: 
precisely nothing. Given this, how might we consider the relation between 
belief as a condition of value? The response to this is complex and not fully 
located in an empirical project, because not all activity is practice. Of course, 
for the individual believer, belief has value, although this value may not take on 
the visible particularities of social forms. Rather such forms can be hidden or 
not articulated and silent.  It is still nevertheless in the main socially valorised 
(and when not at a societal level, such belief becomes variously economically, 
politically, culturally, religiously, ethnically sectarian) and this socially valorised 
form takes on different contours which require us to be imaginative. Kojin 
Karatani notes this as “silent trade” when he says
let us consider where exchange among communities was practiced. 
What we call the market traces its origins to this. One example of early 
forms of the market is silent trade: one group leaves some trading goods 
at a particular location and withdraws, and the other group comes out 
to examine the goods. If they like the goods, they take them and leave 
their own goods in return and leave. Philip James Hamilton Grierson, who 
researched silent trading around the world in his classical work The Silent 
Trade (1903), concluded as follows; places chosen for silent trade need to 
retain neutrality. Holy places, for instance, are suitable. These places grew 
into markets. The market welcomes and protects outsiders or foreigners, 
connects diverse individuals and communities, and as a result creates a 
special social space.18  
That sacred and holy sites were considered neutral enough, that is untainted 
by existing human value, is an interesting concept and one which is still 
arguably fetishized today. For such sites are taken to have a pre-existing value 
independent of human existence and action. Yet such sites are of course only 
recognized and circulated by human action. Value takes on more complex hues 
under this conduit: value needs to have meaning which is determined by social 
valorisation, but at the same time it needs to be devoid of such meaning at 
the instance prior to exchange. Let’s consider a contemporary example as a 
symptomatic reading of debt and value.  If we consider savoir-faire – surplus-
enjoyment – as a feature of the relation of debt and value of belief, then it takes 
on a different orientation: one that attempts to dispense with time, an important 
characteristic of value. Firstly, Vighi articulates the logic of savoir-faire drawing 
upon Lacan and Marx:
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What Lacan insists on is the mystification of the obscure meaning of 
the worker’s savoir-faire. At the dawn of capitalism the worker is robbed 
not only of a specific amount of surplus labour-time (abstract quantity 
of energy), but especially of his ‘knowledge-at-work’, his innate creative 
capacity by definition tied to the intervention of unconscious signifiers: the 
‘effect of truth’ intended as a crack within knowledge.19
An ahistorical investment in the movement of belief is crucial to constituting the 
subject as valuable because what it does in many ways is neutralize the subject 
to prove ‘value’ through different modalities such as sacrifice which are not time 
limited. In this way the shaping of temporality is governed still by the political 
economy, but as a precise abstraction of it. According to the logic of belief, one 
is always presumed to be in need and thus, in debt. The struggle is different here 
because one knows what one might owe but not necessarily to whom, given the 
Other is for the most part, imaginary. This does not free us from the quantitative 
measure of debt and value, but more gears it towards another subject or entity 
of considerable more value.  The appropriation of debt is the investment of 
the circulation of belief and sacrifice as specific practices to be attempted to 
measure, despite the reality of both modalities being abstracted from and not 
solely contingent on such practices in the first instance. Put simply, one can 
believe without ever doing a thing to demonstrate it. 
 Belief offers a way to harness savoir-faire within the valorisation of social 
relations more than ever in contemporary culture. It is a fetish which attaches 
itself to the false consciousness of the commodity of belief. Let us recapitulate 
alienation for a moment: Vighi describes this as: “taking[ing] the subject away 
from its being, in the direction of the Other”.20 What a better way to surrender to 
alienation than to belief as the ulitimate savoir-faire? In this way belief expresses 
itself as an actuality on the condition of subjective lack. As Marx points out in 
his first volume of Capital, it is within “the misty realm of religion” products 
take on a life of their own”.21 Therefore the market as a social space mediating 
belief and as physical entity and framing the circulation of the political economy, 
operates at the level of debt and value precisely because we take it as both 
pre-existing us (that is, a belief and social space we are born into), and that 
which frames our current existence.  Belief is both an axiology and praxis of 
debt and value because it operates as an accumulation of capital which extends 
into subjectivity: this means that it aims at precisely depersonalizing debt and 
valuing the person. However, value is conditional on the totalizing nature of 
debt (founded on lack) in this instance which is a localising principle underlying 
subjectivity in the first place. Belief is the contemporary form of ‘ethical’ labour 
because it includes that which cannot be entirely measured and obfuscates 
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critique. It is affective or immatierial labour. Thinking about belief is hard labour, 
for sure. But even more than this, belief operates as a guardian of capitalism and 
a moral rationalization for debt because it is one of the most mobile, somewhat 
fluid and amenable of modalities. It can justify the role and relation of debt 
and value both at subjective and collective levels through the consumption 
of affective labour and thus also within the acceptance of socially valorized 
power relations. In the logic of savoir-faire we sacrifice ourselves to the market 
and yet win in the value of the debt made as gift; for without the debt we have 
no value. In this way the relation between debt and value produce the subject 
and continues its own relation through the subject never being completely 
‘produced’: belief always speaks to the subject’s lack which is a particularity of it 
under capitalism. During these times of precarious employment and increasing 
unemployment, where work is manifesting as a luxury item, investment in belief 
is the currency for modern day capital. And what results in the end is that we 
believe (with)in the necessity of the debt. Belief is an aesthetic (of fantasy) 
which money can’t buy. It sets a moral limit to the market which individualizes 
the relation between debt and value because it is steeped in a moral character. 
For it is debt which is the Other from which – and by which - we gain our value.
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